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The Fifth Circuit Limits the Expansive Definition of “Vessel” for Jones Act Seamen |
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Monday, 04 August 2008 |
 In Rocky H. Cain v. Transocean Offshore USA, Inc.., 518 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 2008), Rocky Cain worked as a toolpusher for Transocean. In 2000, Transocean assigned Cain to its “Cajun Construction Site” in Singapore, where Transocean was building a fifth-generation semi-submersible rig called the Cajun Express. After working for six months at the site in Singapore, Cain
continued to work on the rig while tugboats towed it from Singapore to
the Gulf of Mexico. Two hundred others also worked on the rig while it
was in transit. Upon its arrival in the Gulf of Mexico, the rig was
moored in a “floating shipyard,” where the workers would complete the
rig’s construction.
In September 2000, while working onboard the Cajun Express in the
floating shipyard, Cain hit his head on light fixture and injured his
neck and back. Cain subsequently sued Transocean under the Jones Act,
and he claimed that the Cajun Express was a vessel under Stewart v.
Dutra, which he argued broadened the definition of vessel to include
“any watercraft practically capable of maritime transportation.”
Transocean disputed Cain’s argument, and it moved for summary judgment,
arguing the Cajun Express was still under construction when Cain was
injured and thus, it was not a vessel under the Jones Act. Transocean
offered expert testimony that, although when Cain was injured the Cajun
Express could perform its intended function under limited conditions,
“no drilling contractor would have found the Cajun Express fit for the
purpose of drilling a deepwater well in the Gulf of Mexico.”
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana held that
the expansive Dutra definition of “vessel” applied to the Cajun
Express, and therefore Cain could maintain his claim as a Jones Act
seaman. Transocean appealed, and the Fifth Circuit reversed the
district court.
The Fifth Circuit distinguished the dredge in Dutra from the Cajun
Express on several grounds. Historically, in the Fifth Circuit the
Jones Act did not apply to vessels under construction because such
structures are not yet instrumentalities of commerce, nor are they
being used for their intended purpose. The court then applied this
reasoning to the Cajun Express and concluded that the rig was not
finally complete or placed into service until April or May 2001. Only
then would it gain its identity as a “vessel.” Therefore, under the
traditional Fifth Circuit test, the rig was not a Jones Act vessel at
the time of Cain’s injury. The court cited cases from the Fourth and
Eleventh Circuits, and the Supreme Court that supported its position
that incomplete structures are not vessels.
Discussing Dutra, the court limited the Supreme Court’s expansive
definition of a vessel to structure whose construction has been
completed and that have begun the commercial life as a vessel. The
court explained that Dutra answered only the narrow question of whether
a dredge, a wholly completed structure, was a vessel. The court stated
that Dutra did not address the question of whether incomplete
structures are vessels. Instead, the court believed Dutra’s vessel
analysis turned on whether the structure was “in-navigation” at the
time of the injury. The court stressed that a structure cannot “obtain
vessel status before it is ever put into ‘navigation.’” The court
considered that Dutra did not change precedent regarding incomplete
structures, and a vessel under construction is still not a Jones Act
vessel until it is complete and fit for sea duty.
The court also noted policy reasons its decision. First, applying
Dutra to incomplete structures will mean land-based construction
workers whose work takes them aboard a ship under construction can
potentially sue under the Jones Act. Next, maritime commerce, and
especially marine insurers, benefit from the predictability that comes
with the certainty that incomplete structures are not Jones Act
vessels. If the definition of “vessel” covered incomplete structures,
workers could walk in and out of various coverages on a daily basis.
The court found the current “bright line” rule for vessels under
construction benefits all concerned.
Finally, to bolster its argument, the court noted that, at the time of
Cain’s injury, the Cajun Express had not passed the inspection that the
Coast Guard requires before a vessel can be documented to transport
persons and cargo. The court did not hold that Coast Guard
certification was a dispositive factor, but only that courts should
examine documentation when deciding whether a the structure is yet
capable of transportation.
Fifth Circuit Judge Priscilla Owen dissented from the court’s holding.
She gave weight to the majority opinion, but felt Dutra required the
court to characterize the Cajun Express as a vessel. She believed
that, given the rig’s advanced stage of construction and that it did in
fact transport two hundred people from Singapore to the Gulf of Mexico,
Dutra’s breadth probably required the court to deem the Cajun Express a
vessel.
Source: Alexander C. Papandreou, Partner. Legge, Farrow, Kimmitt, McGrath & Brown, L.L.P.
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