ESAI Intelligence Brief: Trying to Avoid Broader Conflict

Iranian government officials say that they do not want a war with the United States. U.S. officials say that they do not want a war with Iran. Global leaders are warning against escalation and worrying about the economic, humanitarian, and political fallout from the continuing war in the Middle East. Yet a week ago a drone attack on a U.S. base in Jordan by an Iranian- affiliated Iraqi militia group triggered a large-scale retaliatory strike by the United States on targets in Iraq and Syria with senior U.S. officials saying that the response will continue.

Houthi rebels have continued attacks on shipping in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, and U.S. and British forces have both struck individual units that were readying missiles. In addition, they have conducted a larger scale attack on Houthi forces within the last 48 hours. Houthi leaders have vowed both to continue their attacks on merchant vessels and to escalate in response to this latest larger-scale attack. So, the question is whether the warring parties are caught in an escalatory spiral from which they will find it difficult to extricate themselves.

One way the spiral could be averted is for fighting between Hamas and Israel in the Gaza Strip to pause due to an agreement regarding the return of hostages. A less likely possibility is that fighting in Gaza eases or stops in the near-term due to Israel overcoming most Hamas resistance. The United States and others are working diplomatically to arrange a hostage release in return for an extended pause in the fighting in Gaza. Reporting a week ago was that the two sides were very far apart, but efforts have continued, and the situation could change quickly. If fighting in Gaza stops or pauses, Iran’s proxies in Yemen, Iraq, and Syria could use that as an opportunity to stop attacks on U.S. forces and on shipping. A pause of fighting in Gaza does not mean that Israel and Hezbollah would stop exchanging fire across the Israel-Lebanese border nor that Israel would stop targeting Iranian or Iranian-affiliated forces in Syria or Lebanon. In fact, Israel would likely increase strikes outside of Gaza as Iran would use any pause to rearm its proxies in the region.

Another way for the escalation to cease is simply for Iran and its proxies to decide that these exchanges are too costly or that it could get out of hand, endangering political control in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and/or Yemen. This is unlikely for a number of reasons. First, Iran is willing to sacrifice fighters from Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Second, Washington’s statements about not wanting a wider war have decreased Tehran’s concerns that attacks on Iran proper could threaten the regime’s hold on power. One caveat to this second reason is that the U.S. may be conducting covert attacks on Iran and its proxies that are visible only to the Iranian government. Those attacks, combined with the open military strikes, may pressure Iran and its proxies to ease off their attacks. Officials in Washington have hinted that what they have in mind is a long campaign, some of which will not be visible.

If Iran and its proxies were to stop attacks on U.S. forces on the ground and on merchant and military vessels in the seas around Yemen, the United States would almost certainly stop its retaliatory attacks. In the meanwhile, however, ongoing attacks against U.S. forces and maritime traffic will continue to bring about counterstrikes, with the possibility that increased casualties will lead to an increase in the scope of the violence, possibly reaching into Iran.
Source: ESAI Energy LLC